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Most large U.S. companies have built into their capital 
budgeting process a theoretical model that economists are 
now debating the value of. This is the capital asset pric-
ing model (the CAPM) developed 30 years ago by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965). This model was the first appar-
ently successful attempt to show how to assess the risk of 
the cash flow from a potential investment project and to es-
timate the project's cost of capital the expected rate of re-
turn that investors will demand if they are to invest in the 
project. Until recently, empirical tests of the CAPM sup-
ported the model. But in 1992, tests by Fama and French 
did not; they said, in effect, that the CAPM is useless for 
precisely what it was developed to do. Since then, re-
searchers have been scrambling to figure out just what's 
going on. What's wrong with the CAPM? Are the Fama 
and French results being interpreted too broadly? Must the 
CAPM be abandoned and a new model developed? Or can 
the CAPM be modified in some way to make it still a use-
ful tool?
1 
In this article, we don't take sides in the CAPM debate; 
we merely try to describe the debate accurately. We start 
by describing the data the CAPM is meant to explain. 
TTien we develop a version of the model and describe how 
it measures risk. And finally we describe the results of 
competing empirical studies of the model's validity. 
The Facts 
Let's start by examining the facts: the historical data on 
average returns for various types of assets. We focus on 
historical average returns because the averages of returns 
over long time horizons are good estimates of expected re-
turns. And estimating expected returns for different types 
of assets is a significant part of what the CAPM is sup-
posed to be able to do well. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the average return his-
tory for four types of assets: stocks for large and small 
firms, long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, and short-term U.S. 
Treasury bills.
2 
For each sample period, we report average annual rates 
of return. If investors have rational expectations, then the 
average returns over a fairly long horizon should be a rea-
*The authors thank Jaeuk Khil for research assistance and Gordon Alexander, V. 
V. Chari, David Marshall, David Runkle, and especially John Boyd for helpful com-
ments. 
1 For a discussion of how corporate managers use models like the CAPM, see the 
box displayed later in the article. 
2 According to the description given by the source for these data, Ibbotson Associ-
ates 1992, the common stock returns are based on Standard & Poor's composite index. 
This index includes 500 stocks now, but it included only 90 stocks before March 1957. 
For the period 1926-81, the small-firm stock index consisted of stocks in the smallest 
quintile of firms in terms of their market value of equity (their share price times shares 
outstanding) listed in the New York Stock Exchange; the portfolio composition is rebal-
anced once every five years. Starting in 1982, the small-firm stock index corresponds 
to the Dimensional Fund Advisors' Small Company Fund. For the period 1926-76, the 
total returns on long-term U.S. government bonds are from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. Each 
year one bond portfolio is constructed with a maturity of about 20 years. For the period 
1977-91, data from the Wall Street Journal are used to compute the total returns on 
bond funds. For U.S. Treasury bill returns, data from the CRSP U.S. government bond 
file are used through 1976. Data reported in the Wall Street Journal are used for the 
period thereafter. 
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Table 1 
Financial Asset Returns and Inflation 
During 1926-91 
Type of Calculation Stocks U.S. Treasury Consumer 
and Time Period S&P500 Small Firms Bonds Bills Price Index 
Annual Rate of Return* 
Average 
1926-91  11.94%  16.05%  4.94%  3.64%  3.11% 
1926-75  10.89  14.71  3.14  2.30  2.29 
1976-80  14.17  35.55  2.27  7.51  8.85 
1981-91  15.71  13.27  14.14  7.98  4.25 
Variability** 
1926-91  20.22%  31.02%  7.62%  .94%  2.01% 
1926-75  21.46  33.59  5.38  .61  2.15 
1976-80  14.48  25.87  11.16  .82  1.14 
1981-91  16.31  18.25  12.41  .75  .97 
Result of $1 Invested at Start of Period 
Value at End of Period 
1926-91  $675.59  $1,847.63  $20.95  $11.01  $7.67 
1926-75  73.86  109.34  4.29  3.14  3.08 
1976-80  1.92  4.89  1.09  1.45  1.55 
1981-91  4.81  3.53  4.33  2.40  1.59 
Implied Annual Growth Hatet 
1926-91  10.38%  12.07%  4.72%  3.70%  3.14% 
1926-75  8.99  9.84  2.95  2.32  2.22 
1976-80  13.95  37.35  1.68  7.77  9.21 
1981-91  15.34  12.14  14.24  8.28  4.33 
'The annual rate of return is the asset's monthly return multiplied by 12. 
"The variability of the return is its standard deviation multiplied by the square root of 12. 
tThe implied annual growth rate is calculated by this formula: 
(Value of $1 at end of period) i/"-1, where n is the number of years in the period. 
Source: Ibbotson Associates 1992 
sonable measure of expected returns. Notice that the his-
torical returns on different types of assets are substantially 
different. The fact that investors did hold these assets im-
plies that investors would demand vastly different rates of 
return for investing in different projects. 
To the extent that the assets are claims to cash flows 
from a variety of real activities, these facts support the 
view that the cost of capital is very different for different 
projects. During the 66-year period from 1926 to 1991, 
for example, Standard & Poor's 500-stock price index (the 
3 S&P 500) earned an average annual return of 11.9 percent 
whereas U.S. Treasury bills (T-bills) earned only 3.6 per-
cent. Since the average annual inflation rate was 3.1 per-
cent during this period, the average real return on T-bills 
was hardly different from zero. S&P stocks, therefore, 
earned a hefty risk premium of 8.3 percent over the nomi-
nally risk-free return on T-bills. The performance of the 
stocks of small firms was even more impressive; they 
earned an average annual return of 16.1 percent. 
To appreciate the economic importance of these differ-
ences in annual average, consider how the value of a dol-
lar invested in each of these types of assets in 1926 would 
have changed over time. As Table 1 shows, by 1991, $1 
invested in S&P stocks would be worth about $675, 
whereas $1 invested in T-bills would be worth only $11. 
That's not much considering the fact that a market basket 
of goods costing $1 in 1926 would cost nearly $8 in 1991. 
For another perspective, consider what could have been 
purchased in 1991 if $10 had been invested in each of 
these assets in 1926. If $10 were invested in small-firm 
stocks in 1926, by 1991 it would be worth an impressive 
$18,476. That's enough to cover one year of tuition in 
most prestigious universities in the United States. Mean-
while, $10 invested in T-bills would be worth only $110 
in 1991, or enough to buy dinner for two in a nice restau-
rant.
3 
Notice in Table 1 that the assets with higher average 
returns over 1926-91 also had more variable returns. This 
correspondence suggests that the higher average returns 
were compensation for some perceived higher risk. For 
example, small-firm stocks, which yielded the highest re-
turn in this period, had the highest standard deviation too. 
Similarly, in the first two subperiods, 1926-75 and 1976— 
80, small-firm stocks had both the highest return and the 
highest standard deviation. 
However, something happened in the last subperiod, 
1981-91, according to Table 1. Long-term government 
bonds did extremely well. A dollar invested in Treasury 
bonds at the end of 1980 would have grown to more than 
$4 by the end of 1991, which implies a high annual rate 
of return (14.2 percent). The risk premium (over T-bills) 
on the S&P 500 for the 1981-91 subperiod was 7.7 per-
cent, not much different from that for the entire sample 
period. However, during this subperiod, the average an-
nual return on T-bills of 8 percent was substantially more 
than the average inflation rate of 4.3 percent. This unusual 
subperiod suggests that the sampling errors for the entire 
period computed using conventional time series methods 
(which assume that the entire time series is generated from 
the same underlying distribution) may overstate the preci-
sion with which the sample averages measure the corre-
sponding population expectations. 
Clearly, though, across all subperiods, the time series 
of realized returns on these four types of assets are sub-
stantially different in both their average and their volatili-
ty. This can be seen in another way by examining Chart 
1. There we display over the sample period 1926-91 the 
logarithm of the values of one dollar invested in each as-
set in January 1926. For example, the values plotted for 
December 1991 are logarithms of the numbers in Table 1. 
We plotted the logarithms of the values so they could all 
be easily displayed together on one chart and compared; 
the values themselves are vastly different. The chart is in-
tended to further illustrate the great differences in the 
paths of returns across the four assets. 
These great differences are unlikely to be entirely acci-
dental. If investors had reasonable expectations in 1926, 
they would have guessed that something like this would be 
the outcome 66 years later, but still they were content to 
invest in portfolios that included all of these different as-
sets. A question that needs to be answered is, In what way 
are these assets different that makes investors content to 
hold every one of them even though their average returns 
are so different? For example, in what way are small-firm 
stocks different from S&P 500 stocks that makes investors 
satisfied with an 8.3 percent risk premium (over T-bills) 
for the latter whereas they require a 12.4 percent risk pre-
mium for the former? 
The Model 
The CAPM was developed, at least in part, to explain the 
differences in risk premium across assets. According to 
the CAPM, these differences are due to differences in the 
riskiness of the returns on the assets. The model asserts 
that the correct measure of riskiness is its measure— 
known as beta—and that the risk premium per unit of risk-
iness is the same across all assets. Given the risk-free rate 
and the beta of an asset, the CAPM predicts the expected 
risk premium for that asset. In this section, we will derive 
a version of the CAPM. In the next section, we will exam-
ine whether the CAPM is actually consistent with the aver-
age return differences. 
3Table 1 also reports the implied annual returns that would produce those dollar 
values. To calculate these returns, we first calculate the value of the asset if $1 were 
invested in the first year of the period. We then raise that value to the power of 1 over 
the number of years for the period and subtract 1. 
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Chart 1 
How the Value of $1 Invested in Four Assets 
Would Have Changed Since 1926 
Monthly, 1926-91 
Source of basic data: Ibbotson Associates 1992 
To derive the CAPM, we start with the simple problem 
of choosing a portfolio of assets for an arbitrarily chosen 
investor. To set up the problem, we need a few definitions. 
Let R0 be the return (that is, one plus the rate of return) on 
the risk-free asset (asset 0). By investing $1, the investor 
will get $R0 for sure. In addition, assume that the number 
of risky assets is n. The risky assets have returns that are 
not known with certainty at the time the investments are 
made. Let a, be the fraction of the investor's initial wealth 
that is allocated to asset i. Then Rt is the return on asset i. 
Let Rm be the return on the entire portfolio (that is, X"=o 
a,/?,). Here R( is a random variable with expected value 
ERl and variance var(/?,), where variance is a measure of 
the volatility of the return. The covariance between the re-
turn of asset i and the return of asset j is represented by 
cov(RitR). Covariance provides a measure of how the re-
turns on the two assets, i and j, move together. 
Suppose that the investor's expected utility can be rep-
resented as a function of the expected return on the inves-
tor's portfolio and its variance. In order to simplify nota-
tion without losing generality, assume that the investor can 
choose to allocate wealth to three assets: i = 0, 1, or 2. 




(2) a0 + a{ + a2 = 1 
(3) ERm = a0R0 + a XERX + a 2ER2 
(4) var (RJ = a^var (Rx) + oc2var (R2) 
+ 2a1a2cov(/?1,/?2). 
The objective function V is increasing in the expected re-
turn, dV/3ERm > 0; decreasing in the variance of the re-
turn, 3V73var(Rm) < 0; and concave. These properties im-
ply that there is a trade-off between expected returns and 
the variance of returns. The constraint in equation (2) en-
sures that the fractions sum to 1. Equations (3) and (4) fol-
low from the definition of the rate of return on the wealth 
portfolio of the investor, Rm. 
Substituting I -al-a2 for a0 in equation (1) and tak-
ing the derivative of V with respect to ct{ and a2 yields the 
following conditions that must hold at an optimum: 
(5) (ER-R0)VX + 2[oc1var(/?1) + a2co v^ft,)]^ = 0 
(6) (ER2-R0)Vl + 2[a2var(tf2) + alcow(RlJt2)]V2 = 0 
where Vj is the partial derivative of V with respect to its 
/th argument, for j = 1,2. Now consider multiplying equa-
tion (5) by a{ and equation (6) by a2 and summing the 
results: 
(7) [a{(ER-R0) + a2(ER2-R0)]Vl 
+ 2{cc1[a1var(/?l) + a2cov(/?!,/?2)] 
+ a2[a2var(/?2) + a1cov(/?1,/?2)]}V2 = 0. 
Using the definitions of ERm and var(Rm\ we can write this 
more succinctly: 
(8) (ERm-RoW + 2var (RJV2 = 0. 
The expressions in (5), (6), and (8) can all be written 
as explicit functions of the ratio V2/V{, and then the first 
two expressions [from (5) and (6)] can be equated to the 
third [from (8)]. This yields the following two relation-
ships: 
(9) ERt -R0= [cow(RifRJvar(Rm)](ERm-R0) 
5 for / = 1, 2. In fact, even for the more general case, where 
n is not necessarily equal to 2, equation (9) holds. Let 
cow(RifRm)/\ar(Rm) be the beta of asset i, or p,, Then we 
have 
(10) ER, = R0 + (ERm-R0) (3, 
for all i= 1,..., n. 
A portfolio is said to be on the mean-variance frontier 
of the return/variance relationship if no other choice of 
weights a0, (for j - 1,2,n) yields a lower variance 
for the same expected return. The portfolio is said to be 
on the efficient part of the frontier if, in addition, no other 
portfolio has a higher expected return. The optimally cho-
sen portfolio for the problem in equations (1 )-(4) has this 
property. In fact, equation (10) will continue to hold if the 
return Rm is replaced by the return on any mean-variance 
efficient portfolio other than the risk-free asset. 
Note that the return Rm in (10) is the return for one in-
vestor's wealth portfolio. But equation (10) holds for ev-
ery mean-variance efficient portfolio, and V need not be 
the same for all investors. A property of mean-variance ef-
ficient portfolios is that portfolios of them are also mean-
variance efficient. If we define the market portfolio to be 
a weighted sum of individual portfolios with the weights 
determined by the fractions of total wealth held by individ-
uals, then the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient 
too. Therefore, an equation of the form given by (10) also 
holds for the market portfolio. 
In fact, equation (10) with Rm equal to the return on the 
market portfolio is the key relation for the CAPM. This 
relation implies that all assets i have the same ratios of 
reward, measured as the expected return in excess of the 
risk-free rate (ERi - R0), to risk (p;). This is consistent 
with the notion that investors trade off return and risk. 
In specifying the problem of a typical investor [in (1)— 
(4)], we assumed that a risk-free asset is available. If we 
drop this assumption and set a0 = 0 from the start, then 
we obtain a slightly different relationship between return 
and risk than is given in (10). In particular, Black (1993) 
shows that without a risk-free asset, expected returns on 
the risky assets satisfy this relationship: 
(11) ERt = ERZ + (ERm-ERz)^ 
where Rz is the return on a zero-beta portfolio [that is, 
cov(R^Rm) = 0], Rm is the return on the market portfolio, 
and pz. = cov(/?,/?J/var(/?J. 
We now provide an interpretation of beta in (10) or (11) 
as a measure of the asset's contribution to portfolio risk. 
Consider a portfolio p of assets that earns return Rp and 
has standard deviation Sp = (var Rf)
m. Let the standard 
deviation of an arbitrary asset i be and the covariance 
between asset /'s return and that of the portfolio be Cip. 
Now consider a new portfolio with xi invested in asset i, 
-xt invested in the risk-free asset, and xp invested in the 
original portfolio. That is, consider modifying the portfolio 
of an investor who currently holds xp in portfolio p by bor-
rowing $jc, and investing it in asset i. The standard devia-
tion of the new portfolio is then 






Note that the derivative of S with respect to xi is 
(13) dS/dx^ixtf + x^/S. 
This derivative measures how much the standard deviation 
(or risk) of the whole portfolio changes with a small 
change in the amount invested in asset i. If we evaluate 
this derivative at xt = 0 and xp = 1, then we find that 
(14) dSfdx, U^, = C,p/Sp = (Cip/Sp)Sp = P,Sp. 
Notice that dSldx^ = That is, at the margin, an addi-
tional dollar invested in asset i (by borrowing the dollar) 
increases the standard deviation of the portfolio by fyS 
and not by S).
4 Since Sp does not depend on the particular 
asset i, P, measures the relevant risk up to a scale multi-
ple. In other words, when assets are held in a portfolio, 
the right measure of the increase in the portfolio risk due 
to an additional dollar of investment in the asset is the be-
ta of the asset, not the volatility of its return. 
To see this more clearly, consider the following exam-
ple. Suppose an investor is holding $1,000 in a portfolio 
that includes stocks of all firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Ex-
change (AMEX), where the investment proportions are 
the same as the relative market capitalization of the stocks 
of the firms. Suppose that all dividends are reinvested in 
4Note that we could have started our derivations of equation (10) by using the fact 
that investors trade off expected returns (that is, means) and risk (that is, variances) 
when making portfolio decisions. Suppose that investors are indifferent between assets 
that yield the same return/risk ratios; that is, suppose that {dRldxy{dSldx^\x=0 x =l is 
constant for all i, where R = x:,/?, + xpRp - jt,/?0. Then (ER-R0)/p, must be constant; 
hence, equation (10) holds. 
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How the CAPM Helps Corporate Managers 
Models like the capital asset pricing model (the CAPM) help 
corporate managers by providing them with a practical way 
to learn about how investors judge the riskiness of potential 
investment opportunities. This helps managers use the re-
sources of their firms more efficiently. 
The Manager's Problem 
In modem industrial economies, managers don't easily know 
what the firm's owners want them to do. Ownership and 
management are typically quite separate. Managers are hired 
to act in the interests of owners, who hold stock in the cor-
poration but are otherwise not involved in the business. 
Owners send some general messages to managers through 
the stock market. If stockholders do not like what managers 
are doing, they sell their stocks, and the market value of the 
firm's stock drops. The representatives of stockholders on 
the firm's board of directors notice this and turn to the man-
agers for corrective action. In this way, therefore, stock prices 
act like an oversight mechanism. They monitor the activities 
of managers by aggregating the opinions of the stockholders. 
However, stock prices don't act fast enough. They don't 
give managers specific directions ahead of time about which 
projects to pursue and which to avoid. Managers must make 
these capital expenditure decisions on their own and then 
later find out, by the stock market's reaction, whether or not 
the firm's owners approve. 
Disapproval can be costly. In the United States in 1992, 
for example, capital expenditures by the corporate business 
sector (excluding farming and finance) totaled $397 billion 
(or 6.6 percent of the annual gross domestic product). These 
expenditures usually cannot be recovered if stockholders dis-
approve of them. 
The Classic Solution 
In view of this, capital budgeting has a central role in both 
the theory and the practice of managerial finance. 
Theory suggests one simple rule for corporate managers 
to follow when making capital expenditure decisions: Maxi-
mize the value of the firm. Then, if some stockholders dis-
agree with management decisions, they can sell their stock 
and be at least as well off as if management had made dif-
ferent decisions. This idea is the basis for the classic theoret-
ical recommendation that managers only invest in those proj-
ects which have a positive net present value. 
In practice, however, following that simple rule is not 
simple. It requires, among other things, estimating the net 
present value of every project under consideration. Corpora-
tions thus spend a substantial amount of resources evaluating 
potential projects. 
A key input to that process is the cost to the firm of fi-
nancing capital expenditures, known more simply as the cost 
of capital This is the expected rate of return that investors 
will require for investing in a specific project or financial as-
set. The cost of capital typically depends on the particular 
project and the risk associated with it. To be able to evaluate 
projects effectively, managers must understand how inves-
tors assess that risk and how they determine what risk pre-
mium to demand. 
The CAPM's Role 
Providing such an understanding is the focus of most research 
in the area of asset pricing. An asset pricing model provides 
a method of assessing the riskiness of cash flows from a proj-
ect. The model also provides an estimate of the relationship 
between that riskiness and the cost of capital (or the risk pre-
mium for investing in the project). 
According to the CAPM, the only relevant measure of a 
project's risk is a variable unique to this model, known as the 
project's beta. In the CAPM, the cost of capital is an exact 
linear function of the rate on a risk-free project and the beta 
of the project being evaluated. A manager who has an esti-
mate of the beta of a potential project can use the CAPM to 
estimate the cost of capital for the project. 
If the CAPM captures investors' behavior adequately, 
then the historical data should reveal a positive linear rela-
tion between the average return on financial assets and their 
betas. Also, no other measure of risk should be able to ex-
plain the differences in average returns across financial as-
sets that are not explained by CAPM betas. Empirical stud-
ies of the CAPM have supported this model on both of those 
points—until recently, as the accompanying article describes. Table 2 
Selected Stock Returns, Volatilities, and Betas 
During 1972-91 
Relation to Total Portfolio* 
Effect on Portfolio 
Monthly Rate of Return S.D. of $1 
Stock Increase 
Firm (/') Mean S.D .($) Beta (p) (dS/dXj) 
American Telephone and Telegraph  1.19  5.36  .552  2.63 
Bristol-Myers Squibb  1.56  7.08  .986  4.70 
Coca-Cola  1.40  6.75  .917  4.37 
Consolidated Edison  1.61  7.38  .566  2.70 
Dayton Hudson  1.53  9.69  1.191  5.68 
Digital Equipment  1.13  10.25  1.278  6.09 
Exxon  1.47  5.26  .729  3.47 
Ford Motor  1.15  8.32  .968  4.61 
International Business Machines  .61  6.03  .769  3.66 
McDonald's  1.37  8.15  1.129  5.38 
McGraw-Hill  1.41  8.15  1.075  5.12 
*The total portfolio is $1,000 invested in all stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX. 
Source: Center for Research on Security Prices, University of Chicago 
that portfolio. Now suppose that the investor borrows $1 
and invests in stocks of one of the randomly selected 11 
firms listed in Table 2. There we report the sample means 
and the sample standard deviations of the monthly per-
centage rates of return for these 11 stocks along with their 
sample betas, computed with respect to the index of all 
stocks on the NYSE and AMEX (the total portfolio). We 
also report there the change in the total portfolio's stan-
dard deviation with a $1 increase in the holdings of any 
of the stocks. If, as we have found above, dS/dxl = 
then we should observe that across stocks those changes 
(dS/dx) are a scale multiple of the betas for the 11 stocks. 
Chart 2 plots the incremental standard deviation, dS/dx{, 
against the beta for each asset L Notice that the points lie 
on a positively sloped straight line; that is, the beta of an 
asset does measure the incremental risk. Chart 3 plots 
dS/dx; against St. Notice that this relationship has no par-
ticular pattern; that is, the volatility of the return on the as-
set is not the right measure of its riskiness. 
When the CAPM assumptions are satisfied, everyone 
in the economy will hold all risky assets in the same pro-
portion. Hence, the betas computed with reference to ev-
ery individual's portfolio will be the same, and we might 
as well compute betas using the market portfolio of all as-
sets in the economy. The CAPM predicts that the ratio of 
the risk premium to the beta of every asset is the same. 
That is, every investment opportunity provides the same 
amount of compensation for any given level of risk, when 
beta is used as the measure of risk. 
The Tests 
Now we want to see how the CAPM measures up to the 
data. As we shall see, there's some debate about that. 
Methods 
If expected returns and betas were known, then all we 
would have to do to examine the empirical support for the 
CAPM is to plot the return and beta data against each oth-
er. Unfortunately, neither of these is known. We have to Ravi Jagannathan, Ellen R. McGrattan 
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form estimates of them to use in empirical tests. We do 
this by assuming that sample analogs correspond to popu-
lation values plus some random noise. The noise is typi-
Chart 2-3 
Beta vs. Return Volatility as the Right Measure of Risk 
The Relationship Between Alternative Risk Measures 
and the Effect on a Total Portfolio's Variability 
of Investing an Extra Dollar in Each of 11 Stocks* 
Chart 2 Beta of the Stock 
Portfolio 
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*The stocks are listed in Table 2. The total portfolio is $1,000 invested in all stocks 
traded on the NYSE and AMEX. 
cally very large for individual assets, but less for port-
folios. To understand why noise creates problems, notice 
that two portfolios with measured betas that are very dif-
ferent could well have the same population betas if the 
measurement error is very large. The objectives are to have 
sufficient dispersion in asset betas and to measure this dis-
persion sufficiently precisely. 
Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) came up with a 
clever strategy that creates portfolios with very different 
betas for use in empirical tests. They estimate betas based 
on history (by regressing historical returns on a proxy for 
the market portfolio), sort assets based on historical betas, 
group assets into portfolios with increasing historical be-
tas, hold the portfolios for a selected number of years, and 
change the portfolio composition periodically. As long as 
historical betas contain information about population be-
tas, this procedure will create portfolios with sufficient dis-
persion in betas across assets. 
Because this method uses estimates of the expected re-
turn and beta, the relation being examined using data is 
not (10) or (11) but rather 
(15) ^ = Yo + Yi bp + £p 
where rp is an estimate of the expected excess return on 
portfolio p (the difference between the return on the port-
folio and the return on a risk-free asset); bp is an estimate 
of beta for portfolio p; yx is the market price of risk, the 
risk premium for bearing one unit of beta risk; y0 is the 
zero-beta rate, the expected return on an asset which has 
a beta of zero; and Ep is a random disturbance term in the 
regression equation. Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) use 
time series data on returns to construct a sample average 
for rp (rp = Ylt=\rpt/Ty where rpt is the excess return at time 
t). However, there are problems with the standard errors 
on y0 and yx obtained by a least squares regression of av-
erage excess returns on estimated betas. Therefore, Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes suggest computing the standard errors 
of the parameters in the cross-sectional regression in the 
following way: First run a cross-sectional regression for 
each period for which data on returns are available. This 
procedure generates a time series of parameter estimates. 
Then use the standard deviation of the estimated time se-
ries of parameters as the standard error of the parameter 
in the cross-sectional regression.
5 
Source of basic data: Center for Research on Security Prices, University of Chicago  5For a discussion on computing the sampling errors associated with the estimates 
of the coefficients in the cross-sectional regression, see Shanken 1992 and Jagannathan For the original Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) ver-
sion of the CAPM, y0 should be equal to zero and yx 
should be equal to the risk premium for the market portfo-
lio. For the Black (1972) version of the CAPM, given in 
equation (11), y0 is not necessarily equal to zero. If we 
take a parameter estimate and divide by its standard error, 
we can construct a r-statistic for that coefficient. If the ab-
solute value of the r-statistic is large (greater than 2), then 
the coefficient is said to be statistically different from zero. 
Usually, empirical tests of the CAPM are based on the t-
statistics of the coefficients in the regression equation (15). 
According to the CAPM, expected returns vary across 
assets only because the assets' betas are different. Hence, 
one way to investigate whether the CAPM adequately cap-
tures all important aspects of reality is to test whether oth-
er asset-specific characteristics can explain the cross-sec-
tional differences in average returns that are unrelated to 
cross-sectional differences in beta. To do this, additional 
terms are added to equation (15): 
(16) = y0 + yxbp + y2yp + 
The vector \|//; in (16) corresponds to additional factors as-
sumed to be relevant for asset pricing. In empirical evalu-
ations of the CAPM, researchers want to know if y2 = 0 
holds—that is, if beta is the only characteristic that mat-
ters. 
Classic Support 
One of the earliest empirical studies of the CAPM is that 
of Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972). They find that the 
data are consistent with the predictions of the CAPM, giv-
en the fact that the CAPM is an approximation to reality 
just like any other model. 
Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) use all of the stocks 
on the NYSE during 1931-65 to form 10 portfolios with 
different historical beta estimates. They regress average 
monthly excess returns on beta. Chart 4 shows their fitted 
relation between beta and the average excess monthly re-
turn (where the risk-free asset is die 30-day T-bill) for 
these 10 portfolios and a proxy for the total market port-
folio. The average monthly excess return on the market 
proxy used in the study is 1.42 percent. The estimated 
slope for the resulting regression line is 1.08 percent in-
stead of 1.42 percent as predicted by the CAPM. The esti-
mated intercept is 0.519 percent instead of zero as pre-
dicted by the CAPM. The f-statistics that Black, Jensen, 
and Scholes report indicate that the slope and the intercept 
Chart 4 
A Classic Test of the CAPM 
Average Monthly Returns vs. Beta 
for 10 Portfolios and a Market Portfolio 
During 1931-65 
Source: Black, Jensen, and Scholes 1972 
of their regression line are significantly different from their 
theoretical values. 
This does not necessarily mean that the data do not sup-
port the CAPM, however. As Black (1972, 1993) points 
out, these results can be explained in two plausible ways. 
One is measurement and model specification error that 
arises due to the use of a proxy instead of the actual mar-
ket portfolio. This error biases the regression line's esti-
mated slope toward zero and its estimated intercept away 
from zero.
6 The other plausible explanation is simpler: if 
no risk-free asset exists, then the CAPM does not predict 
an intercept of zero. In fact, Black, Jensen, and Scholes 
(1972) conclude that the data are consistent with Black's 
(1972) version of the model [equation (11)]. 
To illustrate the empirical method used in the Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes study, let's evaluate the CAPM using 
the sample data on stocks, bonds, and bills that we de-
and Wang, forthcoming. For a description of better alternatives for econometric evalua-
tion of the CAPM that rely on either the method of maximum likelihood or the gener-
alized method of moments, see Gibbons 1982, Stambaugh 1982, Shanken 1985, Mac-
kinlay and Richardson 1991, and Jagannathan and Wang 1993. 
6Suppose the relation being estimated is y, = yxr + ur If we observe X, = x, + v, 
rather than just jc,, where v, is measurement error uncorrected with xr then the least 
squares estimate for y will be biased toward zero. The larger is the variance of v,, the 
greater is the bias. 
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scribed earlier. In Chart 5, we plot the average returns of 
those assets for the period from 1926 to 1991 against their 
estimated betas. These estimates of beta—as well as those 
for the subperiods—are reported in Table 3. We also fit a 
straight line to the data by running a linear regression. No-
tice in Chart 5 that the relation between average return and 
beta is very close to linear and that portfolios with high 
(low) betas have high (low) average returns. This positive 
relationship is consistent with the CAPM prediction and 
the findings reported by Black, Jensen, and Scholes. 
Another classic empirical study of the CAPM is by 
Fama and MacBeth (1973). They examine whether there 
is a positive linear relation between average return and be-
ta and whether the squared value of beta and the volatility 
of the return on an asset can explain the residual variation 
in average returns across assets that is not explained by 
beta alone. Using return data for the period from 1926 to 
1968, for stocks traded on the NYSE, Fama and MacBeth 
find that the data generally support the CAPM. 
Challenges 
The CAPM thus passed its first major empirical tests. In 
1981, however, a study suggested that it might be missing 
something. A decade later, another study suggested that it 
might be missing everything, and the debate about the 
CAPM's value was on. 
• What About Firm Size? 
Banz (1981) tests the CAPM by checking whether the 
size of the firms involved can explain the residual varia-
tion in average returns across assets that is not explained 
by the CAPM's beta. Banz challenges the CAPM by 
showing that size does explain the cross-sectional varia-
tion in average returns on a particular collection of assets 
better than beta. He finds that during the 1936-75 period, 
the average return to stocks of small firms (those with low 
values of market equity) was substantially higher than the 
average return to stocks of large firms after adjusting for 
risk using the CAPM. This observation has become known 
as the size effect. 
Banz (1981) uses a procedure similar to the portfolio-
grouping procedure of Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972). 
The assets are first assigned to one of five subgroups, 
based on their historical betas. Stocks in each of the sub-
groups are then assigned to five further subgroups, based 
on the market value of the firms' equities. This produces 
total of 25 portfolios. Portfolios are updated at the end of 
each year. Banz uses firms on the NYSE and estimates 
the cross-sectional relation between return, beta, and rela-
Chart 5 
Repeating a Classic Test of the CAPM 
Average Annual Returns vs. Beta for Four Types of Assets: 
S&P 500 and Small-Firm Stocks and U.S. Treasury Bonds and Bills 
During 1926-91 
Predicted by the CAPM • Actual 
Beta 
Source: Ibbotson Associates 1992 
five size—that is, our equation (16) with \\fp equal to the 
relative size of the pth portfolio. With this procedure, then, 
in (16), Y0 is the rate of return for a portfolio with beta 
equal to zero, and yx and y2 are risk premiums for beta 
and size risks, respectively. 
Banz (1981) reports estimates for y0 - R0 and y{ -
(Rm-R0), where R0 and Rm - R0 are the intercept and the 
slope predicted by the CAPM. The idea is to report devia-
tions from theory. Theory predicts that y0 = R0, y\=Rm-
R0, and y2 = 0. If deviations from theory are statistically 
significant (if the ^-statistics are large in absolute value), 
then Banz would conclude that the CAPM is misspecified. 
For the entire period, 1936-75, Banz obtains the following 
estimates (and r-statistics): y0 - R0 = 0.0045 (2.76), y{ -
(Rm-R0) = -0.00092 (-1.0), and y2 = -0.00052 (-2.92), 
where Rm is a measure of the market return. Because the 
r-statistic for y2 is large in absolute value, Banz concludes 
that the size effect is large and statistically significant. The 
fact that the estimate for y2 is negative implies that stocks 
of firms with large market values have had smaller returns 
on average than stocks of small firms. From these results, 
relative size seems to be able to explain a larger fraction 
of the cross-sectional variation in average return than beta 
can. 
11 Table 3 
Estimated Betas for Four Types of Assets 
During 1926-91 
Period 
Stocks  U.S. Treasury 
Period  S&P 500  Small Firms  Bonds Bills 
1926-91  1.03  1.39  .07 .00 
1926-75  1.03  1.44  .03 .00 
1976-80  .94  1.46  .22 .00 
1981-91  1.01  .99  .31 -.01 
Source of basic data: Ibbotson Associates 1992 
To assess the importance of these results, Banz (1981) 
does one additional test. He constructs two portfolios, each 
with 20 assets. One portfolio contains only stocks of small 
firms, whereas the other contains only stocks of large 
firms. The portfolios are chosen in such a way that they 
both have the same beta. Banz finds that, during the time 
period 1936-75, the small-firm portfolio earned on aver-
age 1.48 percent per month more than the large-firm port-
folio, and the differences in returns are statistically signifi-
cant. Thus, the CAPM seems to be missing a significant 
factor: firm size. 
• Is Beta Dead? 
The general reaction to Banz's (1981) finding that the 
CAPM may be missing some aspect of reality was, Of 
course: since the CAPM is only an abstraction from reali-
ty, expecting it to be exactly right is unreasonable. While 
die data may show some systematic deviations from the 
CAPM, these are not economically important enough to 
reject it. This view has been challenged by Fama and 
French (1992). They show that Banz's finding may be 
economically so important that it questions the validity of 
the CAPM in any economically meaningful sense. 
Fama and French (1992) estimate the relation in equa-
tion (16) for the period from July 1963 to December 1990 
with \|//? equal to size. They group stocks for firms listed 
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) into 
10 size classes and then into 10 beta classes, for a total of 
100 portfolios. They obtain estimates of yx = -0.37 with 
a f-statistic of -1.21 and y2 = -0.17 with a ^-statistic of 
-3.41. Furthermore, even when they include only beta in 
the regression equation [equation (15)], they do not find 
a significantly positive slope; their estimate for y{ is -0.15 
with a standard error of 0.46. However, the size effect is 
significant with or without betas. Thus, their estimates in-
dicate that, for a large collection of stocks, beta has no 
ability to explain the cross-sectional variation in average 
returns, whereas size has substantial explanatory power. 
Fama and French (1992) also consider the ability of 
other attributes to account for this cross-sectional variation. 
When they include the ratio of the book value of a firm's 
common equity to its market value as an explanatory vari-
able in addition to size, they find that this ratio can ac-
count for a substantial portion of the cross-sectional varia-
tion in average returns. In fact, book-to-market equity ap-
pears to be more powerful than size. 
What is so surprising about these results is that Fama 
and French (1992) use the same procedure as Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) but reach a very different conclusion: 
Fama and MacBeth find a positive relation between return 
and risk, and Fama and French find no relation at all. 
Fama and French attribute the different conclusions to the 
different sample periods used in the two studies. Recall 
that Fama and MacBeth (1973) use stock returns for 1926— 
68, whereas Fama and French (1992) use stock returns for 
1963-90. When Fama and French rerun their regressions 
for 1941-65, they find a positive relationship between av-
erage return and beta. 
The sensitivity of the conclusions to the sample period 
used can be illustrated using our four-asset data set. Sup-
pose we repeat the exercise of Chart 5 for several subperi-
ods. In Chart 6, we plot the average returns of our four 
types of assets for the first subperiod, 1926-75, against 
their estimated betas. A straight line is fit to the data by 
running a linear regression. Notice that Chart 6 is very 
similar to Chart 5, which includes the entire sample peri-
od. In both charts, we see a positive, linear relationship 
between average return and beta. 
For the subperiods 1976-80 and 1981-91, however, we 
do not see that relationship. Consider first the plot in Chart 
7 for the period 1976-80. In these years, small-firm stocks 
gave an usually higher return of 35.6 percent while the 
S&P 500 gave only a more-usual 14.2 percent. Mean-
while, Treasury bills did much better than usual, and Trea-
sury bonds did worse. Consider next the plot in Chart 8 
for the period 1981-91. Notice that the small-firm effect 
disappeared in this period. The S&P 500 stocks yielded an 
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Chart 6-8 
A Changing Relationship 
Between Average Annual Returns and Beta for Four Types of Assets 
Predicted by the CAPM  •Actual 
Chart 6 During 1926-75 
% 
Chart 7 During 1976-80 
Chart 8 During 1981-91 
average return of 15.7 percent, and the return on small 
stocks was only 13.3 percent. Yet the two types of assets 
have approximately the same beta value. This fact is count-
er to the prediction of the CAPM. Thus, although we find 
empirical support for the CAPM over a long horizon 
(1926-91 or 1926-75), there are periods in which we do 
not find it. 
The evidence against the CAPM can be summarized as 
follows. First, for some sample periods, the relation be-
tween average return and beta is completely flat. Second, 
other explanatory variables such as firm size (market equi-
ty) and die ratio of book-to-market equity seem to do bet-
ter than beta in explaining cross-sectional variation in av-
erage asset returns. 
Responses 
• What About the Data? 
The Fama and French (1992) study has itself been chal-
lenged. The study's claims most attacked are these: that 
beta has no role for explaining cross-sectional variation in 
returns, that size has an important role, and that the book-
to-market equity ratio has an important role. The studies 
responding to the Fama and French challenge generally 
take a closer look at the data used in that study. 
Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) argue that Fama 
and French's (1992) findings depend critically on how one 
interprets their statistical tests. Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan 
focus on Fama and French's estimates for the coefficient 
on beta [yx in equation (15)], which have high standard er-
rors and therefore imply that a wide range of economical-
ly plausible risk premiums cannot be rejected statistical-
ly. For example, if the estimate of yx is 0.24 percent per 
month with a standard error of 0.23 percent, then 0 and 50 
basis points per month are both statistically plausible.
7 
This view, that the data are too noisy to invalidate the 
CAPM, is supported by Amihud, Christensen, and Men-
delson (1992) and Black (1993). In fact, Amihud, Chris-
tensen, and Mendelson (1992) find that when a more effi-
cient statistical method is used, the estimated relation be-
tween average return and beta is positive and significant. 
Black (1993) suggests that the size effect noted by Banz 
(1981) could simply be a sample period effect: the size 
effect is observed in some periods and not in others. To 
make his point, Black uses some findings of Fama and 
French (1992). They find that their estimate of y2 in equa-
Source of basic data: Ibbotson Associates 1992  7These figures are from Fama and French's (1992) regressions of individual NYSE 
stocks on beta for 1941-90. 
13 tion (16) is not significantly different from zero for the 
1981-90 period. That is, size does not appear to have any 
power to explain cross-sectional variation in average re-
turns for the period after the Banz (1981) paper was pub-
lished. This point is also evident in our data in Table 1. In 
the 1981-91 subperiod, the return on small-firm stocks was 
13.3 percent whereas that on the S&P 500 stocks was 15.7 
percent. 
One aspect of Fama and French's (1992) result is trou-
bling. Although their point estimate for the coefficient on 
beta (Yj) for the 1981-90 sample is statistically significant, 
it is negative rather than positive, as the CAPM predicts 
risk premiums to be. This is evidence against the CAPM, 
but also evidence in favor of the view that the size effect 
may be spurious and period-specific. 
Even if there is a size effect, however, there is still a 
question about its importance given the relatively small 
value of small firms, as a group, used in these studies. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1993) report the average market 
value of firms in each of 100 groups. Firms in the largest 
40 percent of the groups account for more than 90 percent 
of the market value of all stocks on the NYSE and AMEX. 
Thus, for a large enough collection of assets, the CAPM 
may still be empirically valid. 
Another variable that Fama and French (1992) find to 
be important for explaining cross-sectional variation in re-
turns is the ratio of book-to-market equity. However, 
Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) point to another prob-
lem with the data (from Compustat) used by Fama and 
French (1992).
8 The problem is the treatment of firms that 
are added to the data set and then their data are back-filled 
by Compustat. Firms that had a high ratio of book-to-mar-
ket equity early in the sample were less likely to survive 
and less likely to be included by Compustat. Those that 
did survive and were added later show high returns. Thus, 
the procedure has a potential bias. Breen and Korajczyk 
(1993) follow up on this conjecture by using a Compustat 
sample that has the same set of firms for all years; no 
back-filled data are used. They find that the effect of the 
book-to-market equity ratio is much weaker in these data 
than that reported by Fama and French (1992).
9 
• Is Beta Alive? 
The general reaction to the Fama and French (1992) find-
ings, despite these challenges, has been to focus on alter-
native asset pricing models (for example, the interesting 
one in Fama and French 1993). Jagannathan and Wang 
(1993) think that may not be necessary. Instead they show 
that the lack of empirical support for the CAPM may be 
due to the inappropriateness of some assumptions made to 
facilitate the empirical analysis of the model. Such an anal-
ysis must include a measure of the return on the aggregate 
wealth portfolio of all agents in the economy, and Jagan-
nathan and Wang say most CAPM studies do not do that. 
Most empirical studies of the CAPM assume, instead, 
that the return on broad stock market indexes, like the 
NYSE composite index, is a reasonable proxy for the re-
turn on the true market portfolio of all assets in the econo-
my. However, in the United States, only one-third of non-
governmental tangible assets are owned by the corporate 
sector, and only one-third of corporate assets are financed 
by equity. Furthermore, intangible assets, like human capi-
tal, are not captured by stock market indexes. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1993) abandon the assumption 
that the broad stock market indexes are adequate. Follow-
ing Mayers (1972), they include human capital in their 
measure of wealth. Since human capital is, of course, not 
directly observable, Jagannathan and Wang must use a 
proxy for it. They choose the growth of labor income. 
They build human capital into the CAPM this way: Let 
R^ be the return to the value-weighted portfolio of all 
stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX, and let Rt be the 
growth rate of per capita labor income. Then Jagannathan 
and Wang's version of the CAPM is given by 
(17) ERp = a0 + a,P7 + a£'p 
where ERp is the expected return on portfolio p, $p
w is the 
risk of portfolio p relative to the value-weighted port-
folio of all stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX 
[cov(/?/7,/?vJ/var(/?yvv)], and $
lp is the risk of portfolio p rel-
ative to wealth due to human capital [co\{RpyR^N^{R^\. 
With human capital included in this way, Jagannathan 
and Wang (1993) show that the CAPM is able to explain 
28 percent of the cross-sectional variation in average re-
turns in the 100 portfolios studied by Fama and French 
(1992). Since only 1.4 percent of the cross-sectional varia-
tion can be explained by a traditional market portfolio that 
8Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988) also point out this bias in the Compustat 
data. 
9Compustat claims that it rarely adds more than two years of back data when it 
adds a firm to its list. In view of this, in their follow-up article, Fama and French 
(1993) omit the first two years of data, but they still find that average returns are strong-
ly related to the book-to-market equity ratio in the cross section. Hence, the reason for 
this effect is still unknown. 
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includes only stocks on the NYSE and AMEX, the addi-
tion of human capital makes a significant difference. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1993, forthcoming) also look 
in another direction. Several studies have pointed out that 
betas of assets vary over the business cycle in a systematic 
way (for example, Harvey 1989; Ferson and Harvey 1991, 
1993; and Ferson and Korajczyk 1995). When Jagan-
nathan and Wang (1993, forthcoming) also allow for time-
varying betas, they show that the CAPM is able to explain 
57 percent of the cross-sectional variation in average re-
turns. They show that not all time variations in beta mat-
ter—only those that comove with the expected risk premi-
um on the market portfolio. Since the market risk premi-
um is highly correlated with other macroeconomic aggre-
gates that also vary over the business cycle, only the part 
of the time variation in the asset's beta that can be pre-
dicted using variables that help forecast the business cycle 
matters for explaining expected returns. 
To build this part into the CAPM, let Rpr be the differ-
ence between the yields on low- and high-grade bonds. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1993, forthcoming) assume that 
Rpr is a good indicator of the business cycle and, hence, of 
cyclical movements in beta. They show that the CAPM 
with time-varying betas and human capital implies the fol-
lowing three-beta model for unconditional expected re-
turns: 
(18) ERp = a0 + alp^ + a2p; + a3p: 
where = cavW^R^yhnriR^). In (18), ^ provides 
a measure of the instability of the beta of portfolio p. If 
we hold other things constant, then assets with larger beta 
instability should earn a higher expected return. When 
Jagannathan and Wang (1993, forthcoming) include firm 
size in (18), they find that size has little ability to explain 
what is left unexplained by the three-beta model. 
In Charts 9-11, we reproduce Figures 1, 3, and 4 of 
Jagannathan and Wang (forthcoming) which illustrate the 
performance of the various versions of their model. All 
versions use data for 100 portfolios of stocks traded on the 
NYSE and AMEX during July 1963-December 1990. 
Chart 9 is based on a standard CAPM. It is a plot of the 
realized average returns against the fitted expected returns 
using estimated parameters when only P™ is included in 
the regression equation. If the predictions of the model are 
consistent with the data, the points should lie on the 45-
degree line. Clearly, they don't. With only stock betas in-
cluded in the model, the fitted expected returns are all 
Chart 9-11 
The Effects of Modifying the CAPM 
Fitted Expected Returns vs. Realized Average Returns 
for 100 Portfolios of NYSE and AMEX Stocks 
During July 1963-December 1990 
Chart 9 A Standard One-Beta Model 
Expected 
1.6-
Chart 10 A Model With Human Capital 
and Time-Varying Betas ... 
Expected 
Chart 11 ..  . And Firm Size 
Expected 
.4 .8 1.2 1.6 
Realizi 
Source: Jagannathan and Wang, forthcoming (Figures 1,3, and 4) 
15 about the same despite the variation in realized average 
returns. Chart 10 shows the effect of adding human capital 
and time-varying betas to the model. Now the cluster of 
points comes close to lining up on the 45-degree line; the 
performance of the model improves significantly with (3^ 
and (3£
r included. Finally, Chart 11 shows what happens 
when the model includes size as well. The fact that Charts 
10 and 11 look so much alike is consistent with the predic-
tion that beta alone is the relevant variable for explaining 
average returns. 
Thus, Jagannathan and Wang (1993, forthcoming) di-
rectly respond to the challenge of Fama and French (1992, 
p. 449), who assert that "resuscitation of the SLB [Sharpe 
1964-Lintner 1965-Black 1972] model requires that a bet-
ter proxy for the market portfolio (a) overturns our evi-
dence that the simple relation between (3 and average stock 
returns is flat and (b) leaves (3 as the only variable rele-
vant for explaining average returns." The version of the 
CAPM that Jagannathan and Wang use has three betas 
and hence does not meet condition (b). Therefore, perhaps 
their results should be viewed not as a modification of the 
CAPM but rather as the development of a new asset pric-
ing model. However, Jagannathan and Wang demonstrate 
that when the use of a better proxy (including human cap-
ital) for the market portfolio results in a two-beta model 
instead of a one-beta model and when the CAPM holds 
in a conditional sense (period-by-period with betas and ex-
pected returns varying over time), unconditional expected 
returns will be linear with market beta as well as a mea-
sure of beta instability over business cycles. One could 
therefore argue that the CAPM really implies that more 
than beta is needed to explain the cross section of expect-
ed returns on financial assets. 
In Sum 
To summarize, although Fama and French (1992) make 
a persuasive case against the CAPM, recent studies have 
challenged their results. There have also been modifica-
tions of the Sharpe 1964-Lintner 1965-Black 1972 CAPM 
not considered by Fama and French (1992) that appear to 
be consistent with the data. Whether or not these alterna-
tive models will themselves withstand further scrutiny is 
yet to be determined. 
Concluding Remarks 
With academics debating the value of the CAPM, what 
are companies that now use it in their capital budgeting 
process to do? Maybe nothing different. Obviously, capital 
budgeting decisions were made before there was a CAPM, 
and they can be made again without it. But the data seem 
to suggest that those who choose to use the CAPM now 
despite the academic debate will actually not be getting 
worthless advice. Recall our Chart 5, where we plotted the 
return/beta relationship for four types of assets over a peri-
od as long as 66 years. The result was more-or-less a pos-
itively sloped, straight line, just as the CAPM predicts. As 
we saw, that straight-line relationship breaks down over 
shorter time periods, and academics continue to debate 
why that is so. But for now, for those interested in the 
longer view, the CAPM still seems to have something to 
offer. 
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